In its orthodoxy standard frequentist statistics deals only with aleatory probability, suppressing the intuitive epistemic probability representing inferential uncertainty. Condence distributions, which are posterior distributions not based on any Bayesian priors, are discussed in nontechnical terms, with emphasis on the condence curve. The correspondence between condence curves and likelihoods allows independent condence curves and condence intervals to be integrated. Condence and (serious) p-values are interpreted as epistemic probabilities, which do not fully follow ordinary probability calculus. Dimension reduction and other operations might be done on the likelihood related to the condence curve. Condence distributions and objective Bayes have much in common.
Introduction
In this short essay I suggest that the condence of condence intervals and condence distributions is a concept of epistemic probability. A p-value for signicance testing being a condence obtained from a condence distribution is also understood as an epistemic probability. These epistemic probabilities are interpersonal since they only depend on the model and the data. Whenever the model and the data are accepted, condence is the appropriate probability representing inferential uncertainty in the context of statistical inference in empirical science.
The word`probability' has a long and complex history. Before the Renaissance Probability, from the Latin`probabilitas', was used as an ordinal measure of authority: worthy of approbation (Hacking 1975, p. 18) . The German Wahrscheinlichkeit is`true-seemingness', the same as the Scandinavian Sannsynlighet. Probability was originally a purely epistemic concept. It was mostly qualitative, ordering statements with respect to degree of belief, and their epistemic probability or their weight was based on knowledge and/or authority. Hacking (1975, p. 73) dates the modern concept of probability to the year 1662 when La logique ou l'art de penser (Arnauld, and Nicole 1662) was published from the abbey Port Royal to which Blaise Pascal was associated. From that year attempts were made to quantify probability by mathematical arguments, particularly by counting the favorable outcomes for an event in an equi-probable model. Probability thus got its Janus face. Epistemic probabilities of parameters or statements characterizing the uncertainty surrounding our knowledge, obtained from mathematical argument and/or empirical observations, faced one way. Aleatory probability representing chances of events in real experiments or processes in society or nature, thought of as long-term frequencies in repeated experiments, faced the other way. Epistemic probability can be subjective, intersubjective or logical. The subjective Bayesian uses Bayes' lemma to update her personal probability distributions in view of the data and the model. When IPCC states It is extremely likely that more than half of the observed increase in global surface temperature from 1951 to 2010 was caused by the anthropogenic increase in greenhouse gas concentrations and other anthropogenic forcings together (IPCC 2013, Summary for Policymakers, p. 17), and codies`extremely likely' to be more than 95% probable, they employ an intersubjective concept of epistemic probability. Fisher's ducial probability distributions, and also their generalizations (Hannig et al. 2016 ) as well as the ingenious inferential models of Martin and Liu (2015) , which often are condence distributions, represent logical epistemic probabilities. Kalbeisch and Sprott (1967) say that the ducial distribution of θ is not a distribution of belief, but a summary of the information about θ provided by the observations which one is free to believe or disbelieve. Fisher would probably have agreed to the rst part of the statement, but he would have added that the rational mind would then have the ducial distribution as knowledge, and in that sense regard it as his or her distribution of belief obtained by pure logic.
The basically dual nature of probability has not been easy to handle. The eld of statistics has been swinging between epistemic and aleatory probability. From the time of Bayes and Laplace, probability has mostly been understood as epistemic. The Fisherian revolution around 1920 (Hald 1993 , p. 1), followed by works of Neyman, Pearson, Wald and others, swung probability to be purely aleatory. In the last half-century the Bayesian tradition has been revitalized, and statistical inference is now split between frequentists and Bayesians, i.e. roughly between those who understands probability as aleatory and those who see it as epistemic. The division of the eld in these two camps is unfortunate. The estimation of model parameters is an essential part of empirical science. There are also other statistical aspects of empirical science, but we shall concentrate on estimation, including the assessment of the uncertainties surrounding point estimates. The Bayesian posterior distribution is an eminent representation of what has been learned and how uncertain this knowledge is, provided the prior distribution used to obtain the posterior really represents the a priori information available. When this provision is in doubt the Bayesian posterior will also be in doubt. This diculty had bothered authors in the 19th Century, see e.g. Boole (1854 p.370). It led Fisher (1930) to suggest his ducial distribution for a scalar parameter. The great virtue of the ducial distribution is that it often represents an epistemic distribution for a parameter based on the data and the model, without any prior distribution. Neyman (1934) Fiducial distributions were largely neglected by statisticians in the last half-century because they were oversold by Fisher, but presently receives considerable attention, see e.g. Cisewski and Hannig (2012) and Hannig et al. (2016) . Fiducial distributions are exact or approximate condence distributions. Emphasizing the epistemic probability interpretation of the condence distribution and the condence curve, these concepts might thus be the basic concepts in the Fisherian synthesis that Efron hopes for.
After a brief introduction to condence distributions and condence curves, I will hook on to the current debate (Tramow and 
Condence distributions
The term`condence distribution' was rst used by Cox (1958) . If for each α ∈ (0, 1), (−∞, θ(α, X)] is a half-open condence interval of degree α for the parameter θ, based on the data X generated by the accepted model, the endpoints θ(α, X) are the quantiles of the condence distribution. Thus, C(t, x) = θ −1 (t, x) as a function of t for given x is the cumulative condence distribution function for observed data x, and C(t, X) is its stochastic counterpart, with standard uniform null distribution,
when X is continuously distributed according to θ. Cox (2013) sees condence distributions as simple and interpretable summaries of what can reasonably be learned from the data (and an assumed model).
Example 1 (Condence distribution for a a location parameter) Let X have density f (x − θ) where f with cdf F is known. Then 1 − F (X − θ) is uniformly distributed, and 1 − F (x − θ) is a cumulative distribution function in the location parameter for each x. Thus C(θ, x) = 1 − F (x − θ) is a realized cumulative condence distribution for θ, with density c(θ, x) = f (x − θ). This is the unique (realized) condence distribution in this simple model. Its α quantile for given
is the tail-symmetric condence interval of degree 1 − α. The Bayesian obtains the same posterior distribution when using a at improper prior. Birnbaum (1961) introduced the two-sided`condence curve' cc(θ, X) with the dening property of having level sets {θ : cc(θ; X) ≤ α} as condence intervals of degree α ∈ (0, 1). By presenting the condence curve, and thus condence intervals of all levels, the reader is given a complete picture of the inferential uncertainty, see Example 4 below.
The concept of condence curve extends to vector parameters where the level sets are condence regions. The dening property for condence curves is that
when X is distributed according to θ. By this property the level sets have the correct coverage probability:
In case there is a nuisance parameter (vector) χ in addition to the the parameter of interest θ, an exact condence curve for the latter has the property mentioned above, cc(θ, X) ∼ U(0, 1) for all (θ, χ).
Example 2 (Normal model) The archetypal condence curve is the normal condence curve based on an estimateμ assumed normally distributed about µ with known standard error σ. The curve cc(µ,μ) = |1 − 2Φ((µ −μ)/σ)| is seen to yield as level sets at degree of condence α = 1 − the familiar normal condence intervals (μ + σz /2 ,μ + σz 1− /2 ).
This condence curve is a symmetric funnel plot pointing down at the point estimate. It is tail-symmetric in the sense that its condence intervals misses their target with the same epistemic probability to each side. The width of the condence curve is proportional to σ. The tighter the condence curve the more informative it is.
Note that a cumulative condence distribution C(θ, X) is a one-sided condence curve for the family of half-open condence intervals. The canonical two-sided condence curve
with tail-symmetric condence intervals (θ( /2, X), θ(1 − /2, X)) at level α = 1 − By abusing notation slightly, I will often write C for a realized condence distribution of observed data x. The same for a condence curve and a condence density. Their stochastic counterparts are written out as C(θ, X) etc.
A condence curve will not determine a unique cumulative condence distribution, without further information. If, for example, it is known that the condence curve has only one local minimum and is tail symmetric, the condence density is c(
But two-sided condence curves need not be tail symmetric. Despite this lack of uniqueness I will let a condence distribution be represented by one of its condence curves, in dimension 1 preferably the canonical tail symmetric one. Actually, I
will further abuse notation slightly by sometimes using the term`condence distribution' for`condence curve', even when there are no proper distribution behind the condence curve. By letting condence curve being the basic concept, more general distributional inference is possible than if a distribution, possibly improper, is required as the inferential result.
As argued above, level sets {θ : cc(θ, X) ≤ α} are condence regions for θ of degree α. This was the reason for Neyman (1934) to be so enthusiastic about Fisher's ducial distributions, although the condence curve was only suggested by Birnbaum (1961) .
By emphasizing the condence curve, I thus follow Neyman's interpretation of Fisher's ducial distribution. I do however regard the condence as epistemic probability ex post, i.e. C(θ, x) is the cumulative epistemic probability distribution when the observed data are x. Ex ante, before the data are obtained the condence distribution is an aleatory stochastic element C(θ, X), with the important property of having control over the coverage probability of any condence region it yields. The Neyman-Pearson school of statistics teaches however that there is only one form of probability, namely the aleatory, and refuses to interprete the condence level as an epistemic probability ex post.
The statement the Newtonian gravitational constant γ is between 6.6723 and 6.6754
(in appropriate units) with probability 0.95 is in my view perfectly meaningful. It is based on the best available evidence (Milyukov and Fan, 2012 ) from where this 95%
condence interval for γ is obtained. The statement is however not acceptable to orthodox followers of the Neyman-Pearson school. They would argue that there is no (hypothetical) experiment behind this probability statement, and with only aleatory probability at hand the statement has no meaning. Hampel (2006) disagrees: But as probably most of those of us know who tried to teach Neyman-Pearson statistics to critical, intelligent, unspoilt users of statistics, these scientists have a strong intuition that even after the fact there is, or should be, something with 95% probability; and they are very frustrated when they are told their intuition is entirely wrong. It is the exclusive use of aleatory probability that is the root of the error, he thinks, and I agree. The normal condence distribution centered at 6.67384, and with standard deviation 0.00080 is what can reasonably be learned (Cox, 2013 ) from the data reviewed by Milyukov and Fan (2012) . (The normal error distribution, which I assume, is however not explicitly mentioned in the source.)
The realized condence distribution is clearly an epistemic probability distribution, and the epistemic probability is in this case of the logical type.
Condence curves might be constructed in dierent ways. One approach is to transform the prole deviance to be uniformly distributed at the true value of θ. For the observed data x the prole log-likelihood is prof (θ, x) = max χ log f (θ,χ) (x), and the prole deviance regarded as a stochastic element D prof (θ, 
is thus an approximate condence curve.
The condence curve (1) may be named the maximum likelihood condence curve.
Not only does it point at the maximum likelihood estimator as its minimum but it also have level sets and thus condence regions consisting of parameter values with likelihood above a certain value and excluding points of likelihood below that value. There are condence curves that share these properties, having more complex level sets than single intervals, e.g. (2) below.
Epistemic probability in the form of condence or ducial probability does unfortunately not in general follow ordinary probability calculus, despite the old Fisher (1973, p.
59) claiming There are in reality no grounds for any such distinction" between ducial and ordinary aleatory probability. A distribution derived from a condence distribution is actually not necessarily itself a condence distribution, as demonstrated by the following simple example.
Example 3 (Condence curve for |µ| in the normal model.) The cumulative con-
. This is however not a condence distribution since H(θ,μ) can be far from uniformly distributed on the unit interval. When, say, θ = 1 the distribution is actually supported on the interval (0, 0.7), and is not even uniform on this interval. From the distribution ofθ, the condence curve
It is plotted in Figure 1 forθ = 1, the maximum likelihood estimate. This realized condence distribution has a point mass of 0.32 at θ = 0. Condence intervals of level more than 0.36 will thus have the lower limit θ = 0 as their left endpoint. Note that the condence curve is minimal slightly to the left ofθ. It actually points at the median unbiased estimate
Some authors have worked toward a calculus for condence distributions. Pitman the ratio θ = a/b is
This prole deviance is exactly χ 2 1 at the true value of the ratio parameter, and
is an exact condence curve. The condence curve obtained for θ whenâ = 1.333,b = 0.333, σ 1 = σ 2 = 1 is shown in the left panel of Figure 2 , while the right panel shows its contour tree which summarizes its structure and that of its condence sets. The condence curve has a maximum of 0.831 at θ ≈ −1/4. Above this level all condence regions equal the whole real line. The data are thus too weak to say anything about θ with condence higher than .831. Below this level, condence regions are drawn by horizontal lines at levels 0.1, . . ., 0.8. At intermediate levels the condence regions are seen to be unions of two disjoint intervals. The condence curve tells us that the evidence in these data for θ is split between positive intervals and negative intervals at intermediate condence. At condence below 0.3 the evidence is contained in intervals around the maximum likelihood estimate ofθ = 4.003. As condence tends to zero the condence intervals shrink towards this single point.
P-values and the quiet scandal of statistics
As condence intervals are found from a condence distribution, so are p-values for most testing problems. For a scalar parameter θ with condence distribution C the p-value for the null hypothesis θ ≤ 0 is the condence of the interval (−∞, 0], C(0). As the level of a condence interval should be interpreted as the epistemic probability of the true parameter value being inside the interval the p-value is the epistemic probability of the null hypothesis θ ≤ 0 being true.
Signicance tests and condence sets are closely related. For a completely specied H 0 : θ = θ 0 against the alternative θ = θ 0 , where the parameter might be a vector, it is usually not appropriate to view the p-value as the condence of the null hypothesis. When based on a test-statistic T , and p-value p θ0 = P (T ≥ T obs , θ 0 ), the set S α = {θ 0 : p θ0 ≥ α} is actually a condence set of level 1 − α. A nested family of condence sets is represented by a condence curve. The condence curve behind {θ 0 : p θ0 ≥ α} , α ∈ (0, 1) has level sets indexed by the test-statistic T . The p-value of H 0 : θ = θ 0 should thus be interpreted as the condence of the statement the null hypothesis is possibly true, while 1 − p is the condence of the hypothesis not being true. The p-value is is thus an epistemic probability. This accords with Martin and Liu (2014) who nds that a p-value can always be obtained as a plausibility in some inferential model.
The provision for the p-value being an epistemic probability is of course that it is legitimate and is not, say, selected as the most signicant result among many, or is obtained from the selected model without accounting for the model selection process. As the condence curve evaluated at the true parameter value ex ante is uniformly distributed, the p-value for H 0 : θ = θ 0 is uniformly distributed under the null hypothesis. Model selection is known to often shift the distribution of the p-value to lower values when not accounted for. This is unfortunately not taken note of in much applied statistical work, state The probability of the nding (or one more extreme) given the null hypothesis (p)
is not the same as the probability of the null hypothesis given the nding, nor does p provide a strong basis for drawing conclusions about the probability of the null hypothesis given the nding. Without a strong basis for drawing a conclusion about the probability of the null hypothesis given the nding, there is little justication for rejecting the null hypothesis simply because p < .05. This rejection the heart of the null hypothesis signicance testing procedure commits the inverse inference fallacy. They go on with The proper-use claim: Some researchers argue that the many problems critics have associated with the use of p are due to misuse of p. If it were not misused, these researchers claim, p would be valuable. The problem with this argument is that no one who has made
it has explained what that value is. What conclusions can validly be drawn from p, other than the conclusion that p provides the probability of the nding (or one more extreme)
given the null hypothesis, which is true by denition and hence trivial? We are not told.
As we have explained in the foregoing bullet points, any use of p to draw conclusions about hypotheses, replication, the role of chance, and so on, constitutes misuse. Of course p is ASA (Wasserstein and Lazar 2016) states among other things: "P-values do not measure the probability that the studied hypothesis is true, or the probability that the data were produced by random chance alone. Researchers often wish to turn a p-value into a statement about the truth of a null hypothesis, or about the probability that random chance produced the observed data. The p-value is neither. It is a statement about data in relation to a specied hypothetical explanation, and is not a statement about the explanation itself. This is the rst and only ocial statement on statistical methodology
issued from ASA, and should not be taken lightly, but I disagree. Reid and Cox (2015) also note the widespread criticism against interpreting p-values and condence as epistemic probabilities, although the increase in general statistical literacy seems to have assuaged this concern somewhat.
There is still wide disagreement and confusion over what p-values are. I think that researchers are right to view their p-value obtained by serious work as their epistemic probability, not necessarily of their hypothesis being true but of it possibly being true.
In the frequentist tradition of Neyman-Pearson there is however no room for epistemic probability. This is probably a root of our problems with signicance testing and p-values.
Working with both aleatory and epistemic probability
Despite its name, epistemic probability understood as condence does not in general follow the ordinary rules of probability calculus. This unfortunate fact was mentioned above. The distribution of a derived parameter obtained from a condence distribution might actually not be a condence distribution, as shown in Example 3, where it also was noted that the implied point estimateθ is dierent from the maximum likelihood estimate. As we know, condence intervals are invariant to monotone transformations of the parameter. So also with condence curves, and thus also their minimal pointθ. It is actually legitimate to transform condence distributions monotonically.
Some other probability calculations can also be done on condence distributions.
When the condence distribution is a proper distribution, like the above 
, is a median unbiased point estimate. We have actually that med[med(θ CD (X))] = θ, where the outer median is with respect to the distribution of the data, which usually is aleatory, and the inner one is with respect to the epistemic condence distribution.
The spread of a proper one-dimensional condence distribution may be dened through a non-decreasing penalty function Γ, Γ(0) = 0, providing the loss function lo(θ, x) = E{|Γ(θ CD (x) − θ))|}, where the expectation is over the condence distribution for given data x, and the risk function R(θ) = E{lo(θ, X)} which is the expected condence spread with respect to the sampling distribution. The loss and the risk may be evaluated via the condence curve cc(θ) = |1 − 2C(θ)|, lo(θ, x) = Γ(θ − θ)cc(dθ ). Again we mix aleatory and epistemic probability concepts.
Example 5 (Location model, continued) In the location model of Example 1, the risk is R(θ) = 2varX when penalty is quadratic, Γ(t) = −Γ(−t) = t 2 , t ≥ 0. To see this, note that in this location model θ CD (X) = X − F −1 (1 − U ) where the uniform random variable U is independent of X.
Half the risk is due to the variance in the realized condence distribution and the other half is due to the sampling variation. This is a general phenomenon. The variation in the condence distribution reects the sampling variability.
An optimality property
The smaller the spread in a condence distribution the more informative it is. The loss function measures the spread in a realized condence distribution. Theorem 6 (Neyman-Pearson for condence distributions) A condence distribution based on a sucient statistic in which the likelihood ratio is everywhere increasing, is uniformly optimal in the sense that its loss function is less than or equal to that of any competitor with probability one for all penality functions Γ and for all θ.
It is surprising that the optimality is with probability one, and not only that the risk is uniformly optimal.
As a corollary, the conditional condence distribution for a one dimensional parameter θ given the ancillary statistic in an exponential family model with a q-dimensional nuisance parameter, is uniformly optimal (Schweder and Hjort 2016 Chapter 5).
Loss and risk should not be taken too literally. Guttman (1985) 
is what Schweder and Hjort (2015) call the condence likelihood. Efron (1993) introduced
2 , which agrees with the condence likelihood in case p = 1 and cc(θ) = |1 − 2C(θ)|.
Integrating the information in independent condence distributions might be achieved by adding their condence log-likelihoods. When the independent condence distributions are for the same one-dimensional parameter, they might also be integrated by adding their normal scores (Xie and Singh 2013). Since Φ −1 (C i (θ, X i )) ∼ N (0, 1) when θ = θ 0 , the true value, Φ(n
is a condence distribution for θ based on the combined evidence.
When only independent condence intervals are available, one might try to combine their evidence by rst estimating a condence curve behind each condence interval.
Let the degree of condence be α = 1 − , and assume that in addition to the interval (θ( /2), θ(1 − /2)) a point estimate is available, which is assumed to be the condence medianθ = θ(1/2). We thus have three condence quantiles available. In the symmetric case when θ(1 − /2) − θ(1/2) = θ(1/2) − θ( /2) we might assume that the condence interval is obtained from a normal pivot with standard error s.
2 . In the asymmetric case with a positive parameter we might assume that the underlying condence distribution is a transformed normal, C(θ) = Φ(
) with h(θ) = sign(a)θ a . Then s and the exponent a are found by solving the two equations From these data a condence interval is sought for the ratio ψ = N e /N . This ratio can be used to estimate the variance in number of reproductive o-springs, which is hard to estimate by other methods. The condence log likelihood for N is simply c (N ) = − . The condence curve for ψ is found by probability-transforming the condence deviance which is found by proling the joint condence log likelihood for (N, N e ) . It is shown in Figure 3 . Since by denition N e ≤ N the 95% condence interval is (0.0467, 1). The condence distribution has an atom of some 0.025 at ψ = 1. The condence curve has a long tail to the right. A condence interval of high level of condence will thus be quite sensitive to the level with respect to its right endpoint.
5 Bayes and condence, best friends forever? Berger (2006) We might thus ask whether objective Bayes and condence might be best friends forever.
The two methodologies have indeed much in common. Third, although condence distribution might be obtained in non-parametric and semi-parametric models, see e.g. Schweder and Hjort (2016, Chapter 11), it is mainly in parametric models the method has been applied. Objective Bayes is also primarily concerned with parametric models.
Fourth, in the usual case with a parameter of special interest, a focus parameter, both methods aims at a good epistemic distribution for that parameter. The condence distribution will often be based on the prole likelihood or the conditional likelihood.
The reference prior actually aims for the focus parameter. Bernardo's reference prior is constructed to minimize the asymptotic missing information (Berger and Bernardo 1992) .
Any prior adds a piece of information to the posterior distribution, a piece that does not come from the data or the model. But in cases when there are no external reasons to chose a specic prior, other than the focus, this piece of information is missing. The reference prior is the one that minimizes this information, in a specic sense, and asymptotically as the data gets more and more informative while the parameter is kept constant. 
Concluding remarks
A particular measurement is to be trusted when made by a reliable instrument. Condence distribution is a statistical instrument. Since condence distributions in repeated use are uniformly distributed at the true values of the respective parameters, and thus that any interval between two condence quantiles covers the true value with the corresponding condence, the condence distributions are the simple and interpretable summaries of what can reasonably be learned from the data (and an assumed model) (Cox 2013 ). I agree with Hampel (2006) that these distributions should be regarded as epistemic probability distributions also by frequentists. Our statistical thinking, and also our communication with students and substantive scientists would be eased by acknowledging both aleatory and epistemic probability. I actually think that even the orthodox frequentist, after having worked hard at an applied project ending up with a condence interval for the parameter of interest, say the Newtonian gravitational constant, in his heart thinks of the level of condence as the probability that the parameter really is within the bounds of the obtained condence interval.
